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This paper analyses the livelihood strategies of residents in the city of Bamenda, Cameroon. It 
argues that the informal economy is not the preserve of the poor. Middle income households 
also play a crucial role. Informal economic activities permit the middle class to diversify their 
sources of income as well as accumulate capital. It examines the role of class in the informal 
economy and analyses the impact of policy on those involved in informal economic activities.  
The paper reveals that formality, informality and policy are intertwined, thus making 
livelihood strategies in cities complex. 
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1. Introduction 
After independence, Cameroon enjoyed relative prosperity until 1985.  From 1970 to 
1985, its economy grew annually at over 8 per cent (Page, 2002, p.44). This growth 
was mostly due to the boom in the exportation of cash crops. In 1977, cash crops 
made up 72 per cent (71.9 per cent) of exports while oil was 1.4 per cent (Page, 2002, 
p.44).  This situation changed in the 1980s as a result of oil exploration. In 1985 oil 
made up 65.4 per cent and cash crops 21.4 per cent of exports, with government 
getting high royalties from international oil companies developing the field (Page, 
2002, p.44).  During this period, public sector employees enjoyed very good wages. 
However, this relative prosperity was not to last for long as trade started to decline in 
1985 as a result of the fall in commodity prices, coupled with a decline in oil revenue. 
External borrowing and reserves held abroad permitted the government to push back 
any sort of reform until 1987, when President Biya announced some budget cuts 
(Geschiere and Konings, 1989). However, this measure failed to remedy the situation 
as deficits continued to rise, and by 1989, the government had no option but to enter 
into a structural adjustment agreement (Van de Walle, 1990). Although the specifics 
of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) differed, four basic elements were always 
present: currency devaluation, the reduction in the role of the state in the workings of 
the economy, the elimination of subsidies in a bid to reduce expenditures, and trade 
liberalization (Riddell, 1992). With this agreement in place, Cameroon had to adopt 
neo-liberal policies which meant the liberalization of the economy and cuts in public 
expenditure. Instead of laying off civil servants, the government lowered the 
retirement age and stopped recruitment into the public service. Pay cuts were 
introduced in 1991 (7 per cent) and 1993 (30 per cent, at first and later 50 per cent) 
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and out-station allowances cut by 50 per cent. Then in 1994, there was a 50 per cent 
devaluation of the CFA Franc in return for $114 million credit ratified by the IMF 
(Page, 2002, p.44).  Putting an end on recruitment into the public service was a 
serious blow in terms of formal employment since the government was the main 
provider of formal jobs
i
. 
Because Cameroon is a highly urbanized country by sub-Saharan standards 
(World Bank, 2002), these policies had negative effects on the huge urban population. 
It is worth noting that the country has seen its urbanization level increase from 35.7 
per cent in 1985 to 56.1 per cent in 2010 (UN-HABITAT, 2011). The urban 
population had to develop livelihood strategies to enable them deal with changing 
times and economic pressure. The notion of ‘Livelihood strategies’ refers to “the mix 
of individual and household strategies, developed over a given period of time that 
seeks to mobilize available resources and opportunities” (Grown and Sebstad, 1989, 
p.941). The informal economy has been a platform where several of these strategies 
are displayed. In fact, it is a vital source of income generation. The “informal 
economy is one way of pointing to how people devised their own means of survival 
and sometimes of prosperity in the urban markets that spring up spontaneously to 
meet their needs” (Hart, 2010, p.152). As with other developing countries, the 
informal economy in Cameroon is very vibrant. According to Cameroon’s National 
Institute of Statistics [NIS] (2011, p.4), the informal economy is now the greatest 
provider of jobs, since about 90.4 per cent of workers operate there as shown on Table 
1 below.  
 
  Table 1: Breakdown of employment in Cameroon 
Sector Percentage 
Public sector 4.9% 
Formal private sector 4.7% 
Informal non-farm activities 35.2% 
Informal agriculture 55.2% 
   Source: NIS (2011, p.11) 
 
One area which has received little attention in the livelihood strategies debate in the 
country has been an analysis of informality, class, straddling and policy. The leading 
writers on Cameroonian cities (such as Njoh, 2011; Page, 2003; Ngnikam et al, 2002) 
have not focused on this sector. Here lies the purpose of this paper. The paper 
analyses the activities and role of the lower and middle income strata in the informal 
economy. It examines the implication of local government policy relating to informal 
economic activities on the different population segments. It argues that informality, 
class and policy are intertwined. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual 
framework to guide our analysis. Section 3 outlines the research methodology. 
Section 4 focuses on the analysis of the results and findings, paving the way for a 
discussion of these results. 
 
2.  Conceptual framework and related literature 
Lewis (1954) dual economy model regarded the small-scale, traditional sector as 
reserve of surplus labour, a temporary disequilibrium phenomenon which will 
disappear over time.  Thus, at first, the informal economy was regarded as a minor 
phenomenon and something that was essentially static; there was no notion that it 
might grow. This view has been challenged by the growth and persistence of the 
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informal economy. It is a permanent, not a short-term phenomenon; and is a feature of 
modern capitalist development, not just traditional economies, associated with both 
growth and global integration (Chen, 2007).  As long as there is formal economic 
analysis and the partial institutionalisation of economies around the world along 
capitalist lines, there will be a need for such a concept as the informal economy (Hart, 
2010). The concept of the informal economy has been discussed widely (Hart, 1973; 
De Soto, 1989; Portes et al, 1989; Servet, 1995; Rogerson, 1997; Guha-Khasnobis et 
al, 2005; Servet, 2006; UN-HABITAT, 2008). 
During the early 1970s, there was concern about the relatively low rate of 
economic growth, third world poverty and unemployment in the cities. Cities were 
growing rapidly and there was no corresponding increase in formal jobs for city-
dwellers. There was the concern that people were piling into cities without anything 
obvious to do there. That was the context in which Keith Hart made his famous 
contribution on the informal economy in Accra, Ghana.  He said that there was no 
‘urban unemployment’ malaise and argued that city-dwellers were not ‘unemployed’; 
they had something doing although often for low and erratic returns (Hart, 1973). 
Several studies (ILO, 1972; Sandbrook and Arn, 1977; Gerry, 1987; Potts, 2007, 
Obeng-Odoom, 2011a) acknowledge its role in job creation. Some informal economic 
activities include urban agriculture, home-based beauty parlours, and food processing, 
vehicle and motorbike repairs, house construction, taxi-driving, portering, street 
hawking, mobile shoe mending and petty trading. 
The informal economy finally became a concept following the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Kenya Mission Report on informality. The report referred 
to it as the ‘informal sector’. So the idea of an ‘informal economy’ could be said to 
have a double provenance reflecting its two sides, bureaucracy (development 
administration) and the people (ethnography) (Hart, 2010).  According to the ILO 
report, informality was widely characterised by (a) ease of entry; (b) dependence on 
indigenous resources; (c) family ownership; (d) small-scale operations; (e) labour-
intensive and adaptive technology; (f) skills acquired outside of the formal sector; and 
(g) unregulated and competitive markets (ILO,1972). While most of these 
characteristics remain valid, further research over the past three decades has expanded 
the concept to include activities that were not part of the original definition (UN 
HABITAT, 2006). These studies seek to include the whole of informality, as 
manifested in industrialized, transition and developing economies and focus on the 
nature of employment in addition to the characteristics of enterprises (Chen, 2007). 
To economists, the informal sector can be regarded as activities involving unreported 
income from the production of legal goods and services (both monetary and barter 
transactions), that is, all economic activities which would be taxable if reported to tax 
authorities (Schneider, 2002). 
The terms ‘informal economy’ and ‘informal sector’ have often been used 
interchangeably.  However, those against the use of the ‘informal sector’ argue that 
informality is not restricted to a single sector of economic activity. By interpreting the 
relationship of the informal sector to the formal sector in a dualistic manner and by 
focusing on the mutually exclusive characteristics, we lose sight of the unity and 
totality of the productive system (Breman, 1976). Hart (1973) stressed that informal 
economic activities in Accra transcended the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors 
of the urban economy. Also, whereas the informal and formal economy were 
previously considered to be two distinct economic sectors without direct links to one 
another, empirical studies show that both are in fact linked to form a continuum of 
economic relations (Chen, 2007). Production, distribution and employment relations 
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tend at some point on the continuum, to fall between entirely formal relations and 
entirely informal relations, with workers and units moving along the continuum in 
varying degrees and often operating simultaneously at different points on the 
continuum (UN-HABITAT, 2006). Thus, the distinction is not clear cut as one sector 
may have some features of another, just as some workers may work in both sectors at 
the same or different times (Obeng-Odoom, 2011a).  
The Multiple Modes of Livelihood (MML) approach captures the interplay 
between the formal and informal economy. It enables a better understanding of the 
livelihoods of individuals and households engaged in both the formal and informal 
economy. The MML approach is a framework which captures the diversified means 
of raising extra income through acquisition of additional jobs, not only on the part of 
the unemployed but also by those with fixed salaries (Mustapha 1992; Musyoki and 
Orodho 1993). 
The basic argument of the MML approach is that macro level economic changes 
across Africa have created a favourable environment for people of all social and 
economic background to diversify their sources of income (Owusu, 2007). This has 
been largely due to the devastating effects of neoliberal economic reforms on the 
livelihoods strategies of various segments of the population including salaried 
employees (Kaseke, 1998). Also, the limited job creation potential of the private 
sector in Africa, coupled with employment freezes, and retrenchment in the public 
sector reduced employment opportunities in the formal sector (Lourenco-Lindell, 
2004). Hence the prevalent practice in several African cities is for people of different 
socioeconomic backgrounds to rely on multiple sources of income to ensure survival/ 
accumulation. Consequently, the informal economy has become an avenue for ‘part-
time’ employment for formal sector employees and a source of additional income for 
many with full-time employment in the formal sector (Owusu, 2007). Multiple 
livelihood strategies have become a way of life in several African cities, and 
therefore, the distinction between those who are employed in the formal and informal 
economy has become more blurry and complex (Rogerson 1997). This absence of a 
demarcation between the formal and informal economy has also been noted in 
Cameroon (Niger-Thomas, 2000) where the prolonged period of economic and social 
upheaval explains the straddling between the formal and informal divide (Niger-
Thomas, 2000). MML is a useful tool to organise analysis of the informal economy. It 
is within that framework that this study is cast. 
 
3. Research Setting 
The research was conducted in Bamenda, the capital of the North West Region. It has 
a total surface area of 22.9 km² with a population of 269, 530 inhabitants, according 
to the 2005 population census. It is located at a cross route, linking cities in 
neighboring Nigeria (such as Calabar and Enugu) to the economic and capital cities of 
Douala and Yaounde respectively (Nyambod, 2010). Bamenda is an interesting case 
study because its government is simultaneously capricious in its interventions and 
limited in its capacity to govern. The local government is not well funded and has 
limited resources, but at the same time it does have a history of authoritarian 
intervention – for example raids on the market and petty business activities outside 
designated market places, driven partly by the ability to raise local revenue through 
this kind of taxation. At the national scale, Cameroon’s political stasis is mirrored by 
a much extended period of economic stasis. The city is made up of Bamenda I, 
Bamenda II and Bamenda III sub-divisions with the city council headed by a 
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government delegate. The councillors are elected while the government delegate is 
appointed by the head of state.  
The informal economy is the most important source of livelihood in the city. It is 
heterogeneous. It includes motorbike taxi riders, mobile food vendors, farmers, 
dressmakers, tailors, woodworkers, auto mechanics, carpenters, and paid domestic 
workers.  In the case of motorbike taxi, this informal economic activity developed in 
response to poor transport facilities and road networks in Cameroon (Konings 2006). 
Motorbike taxi is a pervasive form of transport in urban areas. It provides 
employment to thousands of people especially those aged between 18 and 35 years. 
At present, it remains a male-only economic activity. This sector is largely made up of 
unemployed youths who couldn’t get a job in the formal economy or private sector 
after completing some form of education. There are currently over 5000 motorbike 
taxi riders in Bamenda. These riders can be divided into two groups: the first is made 
up of riders who own a motorbike while the second is made up of those who hire 
motorbikes. In Bamenda, those who hire a motorbike give the owner 3,000FCFA 
(6USD) each day
ii
. Here we see the involvement of the lower and the middle income 
strata of the population. The latter own several motorbikes which they lease to the 
former.  
Street food vending is another important informal economic activity in Bamenda. 
This activity is predominantly a women’s livelihood strategy (Fonchingong, 2005). 
These women are usually assisted by their children. Children who go to school assist 
their mothers when they come back from school, during weekends and school 
holidays. It is a home-based activity. Food preparation is done at home and then 
transported to where the customers are based. These activities are concentrated in 
market places and along the Commercial Avenue. Here again, we have two 
categories: some street vendors have makeshift stalls situated along areas with a high 
concentration of customers. The second category is made up of those who are actually 
mobile, providing a door-to-door service. Mobile food vending is labour-intensive and 
time consuming. The price per dish varies from 200 FCFA (0.4 USD) to 500 FCFA (1 
USD). This economic activity is attractive to the poor because it requires little capital 
for business start-up. Urban agriculture is another major informal economic activity 
in Bamenda. People cultivate crops next to their houses, around office buildings and 
along the edge of roads. Urban farmers cultivate crops for household consumption 
and income generation. Women are the main players in this field and are usually 
assisted by other household members. Common crops cultivated include Irish 
Potatoes, beans, maize, yams, and vegetables. 
 
4. Data collection and methods 
Data for this study were collected through semi-structured interviews. Interviews 
were conducted with 38 individuals involved in diverse informal economic activities 
in Bamenda. In addition, we conducted interviews with an official from the Taxation 
Office in Bamenda and an official from the Bamenda City Council. Apart from the 
two officials mentioned above, the rest of the interviewees were chosen using a 
stratified random sampling. Bamenda is administratively divided into three 
subdivisions – Bamenda I, II, and III. Within these three subdivisions, we randomly 
selected individuals for this study. Observations were used to augment the interviews 
and thereby permit better understanding of the functioning of certain informal 
economic activities. 
Data collection took place from January to May 2011. We personally conducted 
the interviews. To ease the data collection process, appointments were made with the 
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selected interviewees on periods most convenient for them to have the interview. The 
interviews had both quantitative and qualitative themes.  The interviews covered 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics; livelihoods strategies; local 
government policy and their implications. 
Our analysis is based on data from the above-mentioned 40 interviews. Data 
collected were coded and analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. We used 
descriptive statistics such as percentages, tables and frequencies to interpret data 
gathered.  
 
5. Results and Analysis 
The analysis focused on two main aspects. The first deals with the socio-economic 
characteristics of respondents. The second analyses some informal economic activities 
of urban residents, including straddling the formal/informal divide and the role of the 
middle class in the informal economy. 
 
6. Socio-economic characteristics of urban residents 
Table 2 presents the socio-economic characteristics of the urban residents 
interviewed. The aim was to determine the socio-economic standing of these 
residents. This is necessary because we cannot discuss their livelihood strategies 
without knowing their socio-economic background. 
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Table 2:  Socio-economic characteristics of respondents 
Characteristic                                                         Number                     Percentage 
 
Gender of respondents   
                                                  Male                              18                               47.4 
                                                  Female                           20                              52.6 
Total                                                                                38                              100 
 
Age 
                                                  20<30                              4                               10.5 
                                                  30<40                              7                               18.4     
                                                  40<50                              8                               21.1 
                                                  50<60                              11                             28.9 
                                                  60>                                  8                               21.1 
Total                                                                                  38                             100 
 
Level of education 
                                                   Primary                           22                             57.9 
                                                   Secondary                       10                             26.3 
                                                   High school                     1                               2.6 
                                                   University                        2                              5.3 
                                                   None                                3                               7.9 
Total                                                                                   38                             100 
 
Marital status 
                                                   Single                              3                               7.9 
                                                   Married                           32                             84.2 
                                                   Widowed                         3                               7.9 
Total                                                                                   38                             100 
 
Number of Children 
                                                    0<5                                 18                             47.4 
                                                    5<10                               20                             52.6 
Total                                                                                   38                             100 
 
Sources of income  
                                                   Non-farm                         22                              57.9 
                                                   Agriculture/livestock      16                               42.1 
Total                                                                                   38                              100    
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2011. 
 
Table 2 shows that women play an active role in the urban economy. That is, “the 
sector in urban areas that deals with work, production, demand, and supply of goods 
and services” (Obeng-Odoom, 2011b, p.385). They constitute 52.6 per cent of 
informal urban economy residents interviewed. Apart from their role in the urban 
economy, they also play an active part in the household economy. Their involvement 
in the ‘urban economy’ permits them to be better positioned to make significant 
contributions regarding production and consumption within the household. 
As concerns age, majority of those interviewed (28.9 per cent) are between the 
ages of 50 to 60.  The minority (10.5 per cent) are between the ages of 20 and 30.  
While 21.1 per cent of respondents fall under the 40 and 50 years age group, those in 
age band of 60 and above constitute 21.1 per cent as well. Finally, 18.4 per cent of our 
respondents are between the ages of 30 and 40. In our sample, all those respondents 
who fall under the 20 and 30 years age group are men who are single and without 
children. This reflects a growing trend in most African cities whereby men marry later 
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in life (Mensch B et al, 2005). Lack of financial security and high cost of living in 
cities are possible explanations. 
A huge proportion of our respondents (57.9 per cent) have just primary education 
and 26.3 per cent have secondary level education. Just one person (2.6 per cent) 
received a high school education while 5.3 per cent indicated that they received 
university education. Finally, 7.9 per cent of our respondents do not have any formal 
education. It is argued that this generally low educational attainment increases the 
likelihood of low household income because such people get low paying jobs, usually 
in the informal economy. The level of education attained also affects a person’s 
livelihood strategies. Ceteris paribus, the livelihood strategies of a person with lower 
educational attainment level is different from that of a person with higher educational 
status. 
In this study we divided the sources of income into two categories: non-farm and 
agricultural activities as shown in Table 2. About forty-two per cent (42 per cent) of 
respondents get their income from agriculture and livestock while 57.9 per cent of 
respondents derive their income from non-farm activities. Agricultural/livestock 
income comes from the sale of crops (such as yams, Irish Potatoes, Sweet Potatoes, 
maize, vegetables, and beans) and livestock (goats, pigs, chickens). Some non-farm 
economic activities include motorbike taxi service, petty businesses, food vending and 
tailoring. 
Most respondents (52.6 per cent) have between five and ten children. About 
forty-seven per cent (47 per cent) have less than five children. Domestic labour 
contributes to the growth of the informal market economy because reproduction and 
care in households ensure the production and productivity of the labour power that 
keeps the informal economy operating and growing (Kabeer, 2003). Domestic labour 
is of great importance especially in agriculture and other informal economic activities 
such as food vending. In the case of food vending, the input of the girl child is vital. 
Studies conducted in urban Cameroon (Fonchingong, 2005) and urban Zimbabwe 
(Muzvidziwa 2000) show the vital input of the girl child in support of women’s 
informal economic activities. 
There is a relationship between these socio-economic characteristics and 
livelihood strategies. Which are some of these livelihood strategies? How are they 
carried out and who are those involved? This is the thrust of the next section. 
 
 7. Livelihood strategies 
With these socio-economic characteristics of the respondents in mind, we shall 
analyse some of their livelihood strategies. Our analysis shall focus on two key areas: 
urban agriculture and the shipping container business activity. 
 
 7.1. Urban agriculture 
Urban agriculture is one of the informal economic activities which generate income 
for urban residents. It constitutes part of the landscape in many African cities. 
Research on this topic has been carried out in many African cities (Eberhard, 1989; 
Gdadegesin, 1991; Maxwell, 1995; Mbiba, 1995; Mlozi, 1996; Page, 2002). In 
Cameroon, 70 per cent of the population depends on agricultural and pastoral 
activities for their livelihood (World Bank, 2011, p.3).  
In our study, 42.1 per cent of respondents are involved in urban agriculture. 
Agriculture is seen as a major source of livelihood. It ensures food security at the 
level of the household and serves as a source of income through the sale of crops. 
Those involved in agriculture are divided into two categories: the first cultivate crops 
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on private land while the second farm on public land. Ninety five per cent of our 
respondents belonged to the first group. Observations and discussions with 
respondents revealed that belonging to these categories also had to do with class. The 
poorest who do not have sufficient private land cultivate crops on public land while 
the not-so-poor usually rent a piece of land. This distinction has got several 
implications. Those who cultivate on public land do not farm on a continuous basis. 
This is because farming is done on a piece of land they have no claim on, therefore it 
can he stopped at any time by the authorities. Farming on a continuous basis in such 
areas relies on the discretion of the relevant authorities. In most cases, only seasonal 
crops (maize, beans and Irish Potatoes) are planted, reflecting the uncertain 
environment. Also, the farm sizes are smaller. On the other hand, those who cultivate 
crops on private land have relatively larger farm sizes and do so on a continuous basis 
as captured in the statement of this respondent:  
 
 We plant cassava among the yellow yams; then when we harvest the yellow yams the cassava 
remains. So we can't lack cassava, we harvest the cassava, sell it and pay our  njangi 
iii
. When we 
finish harvesting the Yellow Yams, we plant Sweet Yams in the farm. In one farm we have Irish 
Potatoes, Yellow Yams, Sweet Yams and cassava, even Sweet Potatoes. So in a week, you decide 
what you will harvest from that farm to sell. Then you know that this week I have to harvest 
Yellow Yams, next week I harvest Sweet Yams. So you decide how to manage it. Then within the 
week, I can harvest cassava, sell it and buy salt, oil for my household. 
Because farming is done on private land, such people are able to cultivate a variety of 
crops. This is not the case with those who farm on public land. Cultivating a variety of 
crops on a continuous basis not only increases income generated but also ensures a 
regular flow of income from this source. In the end, the poorest generate lesser 
income when compared with the not-so-poor. 
Among those involved in urban agriculture, 43.7 per cent are males while 56.3 
per cent are females. This shows that agriculture is dominated by women. More 
women are involved because they are the main providers of food in the household. 
Also, women prefer farming because the work pattern is flexible and demands less 
capital. This flexibility enables them to perform other household activities. Fifty per 
cent of those involved in food production are also involved in livestock rearing. By so 
doing, they diversify their sources of income. The respondents also mentioned that it 
was a way of spreading risk. If there is a bad harvest then they can generate income 
from livestock. 
All those involved in urban agriculture are either married or widowed. On 
average, they are 52 years of age. The fact that those who are single and fall under the 
20 and 35 years age group are not engaged in urban agriculture is revealing. It 
suggests that respondents, those who fall under this age group consider urban 
agriculture as ‘traditional’ and not ‘urban’. Second, those who are single in this study 
do not have children to take care of whereas those who are engaged in urban 
agriculture all have children. The average number of children per household is four. 
Having more people to feed constrains the married and widowed to be involved in 
agriculture in order to reduce household expenditure on food. 
Urban agriculture as a form of livelihood sometimes causes tension between 
urban residents and city authorities – in our case the Bamenda City Council. This 
conflict is caused by the fact that people also cultivate crops by the edge of roads and 
around public offices. Here the quest by urban residents for survival runs into conflict 
with the desire of ‘order’ by the city council. Urban residents use a discourse of 
livelihood, the city council authorities claim urban agriculture makes cities dirty and 
untidy. A press release in 2009 banned urban agriculture, especially along major 
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streets, encouraging city dwellers to plant flowers and ornamental trees instead. 
Planting flowers and ornamental trees makes the city look beautiful and ‘modern’, but 
it does not put food on the table for the urban poor who depend on urban agriculture 
as a source of livelihood. In view of the vital role of urban agriculture, the city council 
authorities have resorted not to outrightly ban such activities. A compromise has been 
to allow people to continue with urban agriculture but not along the edge of roads, in 
front of public offices and along major streets. Compromise remains the best option 
since “there seems to be no possibility of halting urban cultivation, given its economic 
value to urban residents” (Mbiba, 1994, p.200). Therefore the city council authorities 
have to continue controlling this economic activity as well as making compromises 
where possible.  
Urban agriculture is not the only informal economic activity which runs into 
conflict with the interest of city council authorities. The shipping container business is 
another informal economic activity which causes tension between both parties.  
 
7.2. The shipping container business   
Generally, a shipping container is known for its transportation and holding capacity 
but in Bamenda, it is renowned for its business potential. Bamenda has become a ‘city 
of shipping containers’ because of the influx of these containers into the city. These 
containers were transformed and used for various economic activities such as off 
licenses, restaurants, grocery shops, cyber cafes, computer services centres, and hair 
salons. According to a city council official, there were more than 700 containers in the 
city.  Unlike other informal economic activities, the main players in this business area 
were middle class residents. 
The middle class as used in this study refers to individuals with per capita 
consumption levels of $4-$20 per day. Those who fall within this range are divided 
into two categories: the ‘lower-middle’ class with per capita consumption levels of 
$4-$10 per day and the ‘upper-middle class’ with per capita consumption levels of 
$10-$20 per day (African Development Bank, 2011). In Cameroon, the ‘lower-
middle’ class accounts for 8.6 per cent of the total population while the ‘upper-
middle’ class accounts for 7.5 per cent (African Development Bank, 2011, p.23). In 
terms of residence, middle class households tend to reside in bigger and more 
permanent houses equipped with modern amenities. As concerns asset ownership, this 
class is typically associated with the widespread ownership of major durable goods 
such refrigerators and automobile. They are better educated, have salaried jobs or 
have small businesses, have smaller family sizes and are more geographically 
concentrated in urban areas or along the coasts (African Development Bank, 2011). 
All those (5.3 per cent) involved in the shipping container business in our study have 
a university education.  
Rapid urbanization in Bamenda has led to a shortage of business premises to be 
used for business activities. People migrated from the rural areas to the city in order to 
‘urbanize’ their way out of poverty. The middle class saw this shortage as an 
opportunity to start an informal economic activity – buying shipping containers and 
transforming them into business premises. Those involved in this activity were civil 
servants and private sector workers. This is not surprising considering the huge capital 
required to start this economic activity. The middle class was well positioned to play 
an important role in this area because they could easily have access to credit which 
could be used to finance this business activity. According to a city council official, a 
person needed between 2.5 million (5,154 USD) and 3 million FCFA (6,184 USD) as 
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start-up capital. This amount includes the cost of buying the container, roofing, 
flooring, partitioning it inside as well as making the metal doors and windows. 
The functioning of this business activity as shown on Figure 1 is a good 
illustration of straddling the divide between formality and informality, the 
involvement of the lower and middle class and the government.  
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Why did the middle class straddle between the formal and informal economy? Apart 
from the shortage of business premises, other factors led to an increase in demand for 
shipping containers. One of such factors had to do with security. Shipping containers 
are more secure because they are made of metal. Those operating their businesses in 
these containers did not have to worry about robbery at night. This meant reduced 
cost as there was no need to recruit a night guard.  
This increase in demand made this economic activity profitable for the middle 
class. Once a container was partitioned, a container owner could charge rent between 
30,000 FCFA (62 USD) to 40,000 FCFA (82 USD) per room on a monthly basis, 
depending on the location of the container. Assuming that a container is partitioned 
into two rooms, each requiring 30,000 FCFA (62 USD) as rent per month. The owner 
gets 60,000 FCFA (124 USD) as rent on a monthly basis and 720,000 FCFA (1,484 
USD) yearly. Most of these containers were rented by the lower class since their little 
financial resources does not permit them to buy one. Therefore, they played an 
important role as clients to the middle class. In fact, without them there would not 
have been an increase in demand for shipping containers. The middle class raised 
capital from their formal jobs which were then used for the informal shipping 
container business. This highlights the interdependence between the formal and 
informal economy. Thus straddling the formal/informal divide was necessary because 
it encouraged accumulation. It also gave the middle class the opportunity to diversify 
their sources of income.  
This booming informal economic activity was not to last for long as the newly 
appointed Government Delegate to the Bamenda City Council took a decision to take 
off all shipping containers in the city as part of his “keep Bamenda clean” project. 
According to press release No. BCC 1042/RA/GS/ VOL .1/5 of April 16, 2009, 
container owners were given until October 12, 2009 (later extended to January 16, 
2010) to remove their containers or else it will be removed by the city council. It is 
paradoxical because these container owners had received permission to use the 
containers from the same city council (as illustrated on Figure 1) which later ordered 
them to be removed. The removal of these containers by the city council actually 
started immediately after this deadline. In our case, a policy is usually scrapped 
especially if it affects the influential segment of the population due to their ‘power’. 
In this case, the influential middle-class, backed by support from the lower-class was 
unable to stop the execution of this policy. There are some possible explanations to 
why this policy was executed irrespective of massive opposition to it from different 
segments of the population. The Government Delegate to the Bamenda City Council 
was appointed by the head of state, thus he is not directly accountable to the 
population who if given the opportunity, would have sanctioned him through the 
ballot box. Some city councillors were opposed to the policy because it was against 
the interest of their constituency. Another possible reason for its execution was the 
forthcoming visit of the head of state to the city later that same year. Hence the city 
had to be ‘cleaned’ and secured. According to a city council official, these shipping 
containers posed a security risk. Therefore, it was the right time to kick off the long 
term plan of transforming Bamenda into a modern city. 
Different groups felt the impact of this policy in different ways. These groups 
include: the central government, local government (city council), container owners 
and container renters. The policy had an impact on the central government through the 
loss of revenue from taxes. This policy led to the closure of several business activities, 
some of which actually paid taxes to the central government through the Taxation 
Office in Bamenda. A respondent who was using a shipping container to operate her 
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baby care business was paying an annual tax of 40,000 FCFA (82 USD) to the central 
government. The city council got revenue especially from owners of shipping 
containers located around the Municipal Stadium. However, because of the policy, the 
council lost some revenue.  
The next group affected by this policy was landowners who rented out land to the 
owners of shipping containers. The container owners in our sample paid between 
10,000 FCFA (21 USD) and 15,000 FCFA (31 USD) as monthly rent to landowners.  
The policy led to a loss in this income for the landowners. It is worth noting that some 
landowners had about five shipping containers on their land, so assuming that each 
container owner paid rent worth 15,000 FCFA (31 USD) per month, the landowners 
lost a total yearly income of 900,000 FCFA (1,855 USD). This loss in income 
paradoxically had a positive element because it pushed the landowners to build better 
business premises. We noticed the construction of business premises throughout the 
city, most of them being not less than three-storey high. This means that in the long 
run, landowners will experience an increase in income from rent.  
The fourth group affected by the policy to remove shipping containers from the 
city was the owners of these containers. They constituted the core of this business 
activity, therefore were seriously affected. The immediate effect was a reduction in 
their total household income. Because of their middle class status, they had alternative 
sources of income. That is, the policy of eviction meant a reduction in income instead 
of a lack of any source of income. For instance, one of our respondents owned a 
shipping container while her husband was managing an enterprise which supplies 
equipments to medical laboratories. This decrease in total household income was also 
accompanied by a loss of financial autonomy since she had to depend on her husband. 
Furthermore, owners of shipping containers who took loans to buy and transform 
containers had to use income earned from other sources to continue their loan 
repayment.
iv
 Some owners moved their containers to neighbouring municipalities 
such as Tubah and Bafut so as to continue earning some income. However, income 
generated there was lower when compared with that in the city. The loss of income 
caused some of them previously classified as belonging to the ‘upper-middle’ class to 
be relegated to the ‘lower-middle’ class.    
Unlike the container owners, a significant proportion of those who rented these 
shipping containers for their business activities were the poor – the lower class. For 
some, this was their only income generating activity. According to an official at the 
city council, such people have returned to their respective villages. It is worth 
mentioning that this region already had an underemployment rate of 69.7 per cent 
among males and 81.9 per cent among the female population (National Institute of 
Statistics, 2010, p.7)
v
. So this policy has worsened the precarious condition of many 
households. The loss of the sole source of income means that households have to 
adjust expenditures. The immediate effect is a change in consumption and dietary 
patterns whereby households have to opt for cheaper and less nutritious substitutes 
(Moser, 1996). This, in turn, exposes children to numerous diseases; diseases whose 
treatment further erodes the little income. Once such vulnerable people have 
exhausted the little income available, they start to borrow from friends, relatives and 
informal credit groups. Later, they become unable to repay money borrowed because 
they do not have any income generating activity. The end product is over-
indebtedness.  
The policy of the city council also had general implications. The removal of over 
700 shipping containers from the city led to an acute shortage of business premises. 
This was because business premises had not been constructed to accommodate those 
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who had been evicted. Construction of business premises by landowners effectively 
started after the removal of shipping containers. Thus, it will take some time before 
things return to the pre eviction state. The inability to get new business premises 
partly explains why some people returned to their villages. Also the removal of 
containers is likely to increase the number of unemployed people. High urban 
unemployment might lead to an increase in criminality. On a more positive note, this 
policy has created the opportunity to press the urban development reset button. This is 
an opportunity for the city council to develop a more efficient and inclusive 




The informal economy as a concept has evolved ever since it was first coined in the 
1970s. Its growth and persistence has proved that it is not a minor phenomenon. Some 
refer to it as the ‘informal sector’ while others term it as the informal economy. To the 
former, it is a sector made up of unregistered businesses involved in the production of 
legal goods and services whose income is unreported. The latter argue that informality 
is not restricted to a single sector of economic activity. To those in this group, the 
formal and informal are dynamically linked to constitute a continuum of economic 
relations. Yet, the widely held view is that the informal economy plays an important 
role in job creation. In addition, people are also involved in multiple modes of 
livelihoods which permit them to have several income streams. In looking at 
livelihood strategies, few studies focus on the role of class and policy in the informal 
economy, which explain why we carried out this study in Cameroon. 
Our study shows that urban agriculture remains an important livelihood strategy 
for residents in the city. Those involved are from the lower class. Within this class, 
there are those who cannot afford to rent a piece of land to cultivate so they farm 
illegally on public land. Others rent a piece of land and cultivate a variety of crops. 
Those in the first group cultivate mainly for household consumption because of the 
small farm size while farmers who rent private land cultivate crops both for household 
consumption and the generation of income. However income generated is still used 
for consumption smoothing within the household. The policy of the city council has 
not been in favour of urban agriculture but considering its economic value to the city 
residents, the local authorities have resorted to making a compromise. This means the 
continuation of urban agriculture but not along the edge of roads, in front of public 
offices and along major streets.  
Unlike urban agriculture, those in the middle class are involved in the shipping 
container business. Our study shows that the middle class became involved in this 
informal economic activity because it gave them the opportunity to diversify their 
sources of income as well as accumulate capital. The middle class provided capital for 
business start-up while the lower class made the business flourish through their 
diverse informal economic activities. But this informal economic activity flourished 
as a result of the capricious attitude of the city council. These findings show that 
sometimes informal economic activities flourish as a result of favourable or tolerant 
local/national policies. This informal economic activity came to an end in Bamenda 
when the local government adopted another policy aimed at removing these shipping 
containers from the city. Our study shows that different segments of the population 
were affected in different ways as a result of the policy to end this informal activity. 
Unlike in other interventions, the middle class was seriously affected because those 
individuals who owned shipping containers belonged to this class.  
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These findings show that the informal economy is not the preserve of those at the 
bottom of the pyramid. Formality and informality are not mutually exclusive – we 
have a scenario of a ‘spaghetti bowl’ where formality, informality, class and policy 
are intertwined.   
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Notes 
1. Formal jobs have the following characteristics: they are regulated and protected by 
existing legal frameworks; pay taxes; and there is the existence of explicit contracts 
between employers and employees. 
2. The exchange rate used throughout this paper is 1 USD = 485 FCFA. 
3. ‘Njangi’ is the local name for informal savings and credit groups. These groups are 
very common in urban and rural Cameroon. 
4. Commercial banks and other financial institutions benefited from the policy to 
remove shipping containers from the city. This is because landowners had to take 
loans so as to construct permanent business premises. 
5. Underemployment as used by Cameroon’s National Institute of Statistics (2011) 
concerns workers whose remuneration is lower than the minimum monthly wage of 
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